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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1946-1947'
VIII. TORTS
The volume of tort cases doubtless has not diminished, but
there is little of novelty to report about. Two significant cases
deal with aspects of defamation not heretofore determined in this
state. In Spanel v. Pegler,1 the federal Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed a decision which had dismissed a complaint in libel. The
suit grew out of the publication of a syndicated column in which
the columnist had commented upon the fact that plaintiff, presi-
dent of a corporation, had caused paid advertisements to be
published which were more in the nature of political arguments
indicative of plaintiff's inclination toward leftist tendencies, ad-
vertisements which were certainly never anti-communist in char-
acter. The court noted that, while Illinois law was controlling,
no decision of this state had yet determined whether or not it
was libelous per se to characterize a person as a communist or a
communist sympathizer even though that question had elsewhere
been answered in the affirmative. It therefore adopted such view
as the law to be applied in the case but left it to a jury to deter-
mine whether the article in question was susceptible of being
understood, by the average reader, to mean that plaintiff was
either a communist or a sympathizer. In the other case, that of
Latimer v. Chicago Daily News, 2 plaintiffs were duly licensed
attorneys who were engaged in defending certain persons charged
with sedition. The defendant published an article referring to
that trial in which appeared the statement that "the scum of politi-
cal gangsterdom in this country are represented by as craven a
group of lawyers" as the writer thereof had ever seen. Plaintiffs
claimed that, as they were among the "group of lawyers" re-
ferred to, they had a right of action for libel. Defendant, on the
other hand, contended that as none of the plaintiffs were identified
* The first seven sections of this survey appeared in 26 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REvxmw 1 et seq.
1 160 F. (2d) 619 (1947), noted in 14 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 697 and 22 N. Y. U.
L. Q. 514.
2 330 Ill. App. 295, 71 N. E. (2d) 553 (1947). Leave to appeal has been denied.
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specifically no right of action accrued to any particular individual.
The Appellate Court affirmed a judgment dismissing the complaint
on the ground that where a derogatory remark is made about a
group no right of action accrues to any one member of the group
unless it can be said that the language used applies, with cer-
tainty, to all who compose the group. Again, Illinois precedents
were lacking but ample authority to sustain that view exists in
other jurisdictions.
Note has already been made of the soft-drink case of Patar-
gias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Chicago." The complaint
therein charged both a breach of warranty and also negligence in
permitting a dead mouse to remain in the bottle of soft drink
sold to and consumed by plaintiff. Negligence was found to exist
in permitting the dead mouse to remain in the bottle at the time
of cleaning and filling the same and in failing to discover the
defect on inspection. 4 A claim that plaintiff was guilty of con-
tributory negligence was rejected on the ground that while plain-
tiff noticed an "awful" taste after consuming a portion of the
contents, the assurance of her sister, present at the time, that
"hers was all right" plus the right to assume the bottle was not
contaminated justified plaintiff in consuming the balance of the
contents up to the moment when she became aware of the foreign
substance. The absence of direct medical evidence that the injury
was proximately caused by defendant's negligence was excused
with the comment that the "causal connection" was clearly appar-
ent and that it was "unnecessary for the jury to speculate or
conjecture" as to the basis for plaintiff's illness.
Mention was made last year of the Appellate Court decision
in Miller v. Miller,5 a case which did not involve any new point of
3 332 111. App. 117, 74 N. E. (2d) 162 (1947). A discussion of the warranty aspects
of the case appears ante under the topic of Sales.
4 The court commented upon the inadequacy of the inspection by noting that the
person charged with the task admitted that he had to perform a "tedious" opera-
tion at the rate of 264 bottles a minute, a speed which could hardly permit of a
careful Inspection for breaks, cracks and foreign substances.
5328 Ill. App. 171, 65 N. E. (2d) 597 (1946), noted in 25 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
RIEW 88-9.
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law but did present a novel factual situation with respect to the
guest statute-" The plaintiff there concerned had been injured
while riding in a trailer truck accompanying some livestock which
he had hired the defendant to carry, but a judgment in his favor
had been reversed. The Supreme Court took the case on certifi-
cate of importance and affirmed the judgment for defendant on
the ground that one may be a "guest," even though riding in a
trailer truck, providing no manner of payment, either in cash or
services, is made for the ride2
The right of an infant to sue for alienation of parental affec-
tions was upheld in Johnson v. Luhman8 as a proper extension of
existing doctrines. It is to be hoped that either the Supreme
Court will settle, once and for all, that question or else that the
legislature will concern itself with providing a sound and unques-
tionable basis for such actions.
A statutory change of significance has increased the maximum
possible recovery in wrongful death cases of $15,000, 9 but the
proviso in that statute concerning suits based on deaths "occur-
ing outside of this state" was given interpretation in Carroll v.
Rogers0 so as to permit suit here if the actual process of dying
occurs in Illinois although the fatal injuries be inflicted elsewhere.
The converse of that situation was heretofore held not to deny
jurisdiction.1
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 95%, § 58a.
7 Miller v. Miller, 395 Il. 273, 69 N. E. (2d) 878 (1946).
8330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N. B. (2d) 810 (1947), noted in 25 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REvrnEw 260.
9 Laws 1947, p. 1094, H. B. 17; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 70, § 2.
10330 Ill. App. 114, 70 N. E. (2d) 218 (1946), noted in 25 CHroAo-KENT LAW
RJvIEw 338.
11 See Crane v. Chicago & Western R. R. Co., 233 Ill. 259, 84 N. E. 222 (1908).
